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1. Introduction 
 Because governments have discretionary power to levy taxes and impose burdensome 
regulation on private firms with productive assets and because future policies are uncertain, 
private firms face political risk. Elections, as clearly defined opportunities for large, discrete 
changes in government and therefore in governing philosophy and resulting policy, constitute a 
moment when political risk is articulated and (partially) resolved. If political parties favor 
specific sectors or firms, individual businesses may have a lot at stake in a particular election. 
Given the implications for firms’ incentives to engage in lobbying—both legitimate and 
illegitimate—it is important to test for and quantify the magnitude of such partisan effects on 
firms’ profitability. 
Starting with Hibbs’ seminal paper (1977), there is a very long literature testing for broad 
macroeconomic effects of partisan policy by relating macroeconomic outcomes to election 
results in both time-series and panel data.
1 Unfortunately, it is difficult to cleanly identify such 
effects both because election results could be plausibly influenced by unobservable shifts in the 
macroeconomic environment and because econometricians do not observe ex-ante expectations 
of election results. As a result, there remains a robust debate over the existence of partisan effects 
on macroeconomic outcomes.
2 
More recent studies of partisan political effects attempt to resolve these problems by 
using high frequency data from political prediction markets or regularly repeated pre-electoral 
polls to capture within election variation in the expected future government (Snowberg, Wolfers, 
                                                 
1 See Drazen (2001) for a useful summary. 
2 See Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007a) for detailed discussion of this identification problem and 
Heckelman (2006) for an example of the debate over whether the evidence supports or refutes partisan effects on 
macroeconomic outcomes.   4
Zitzewitz, 2007a,b; Fuss and Bechtel, 2008; Shelton, 2010). Thus far, such studies have been 
supportive of a wide variety of partisan effects. Bechtel and Fuss (2008) find that German stock 
markets exhibit lower volatility during periods of divided government. Fuss and Bechtel (2008) 
and Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007a,b) find that stock markets perform better under 
right wing governments in Germany and the US respectively. Mukherjee and Leblang (2007) 
similarly find that left-wing governments have decreased both mean return and volatility of stock 
markets in the US and Great Britain during the 20
th century.  
More credible evidence of partisan effects comes from Jayachandran (2006) and Knight 
(2007) both of which find heterogeneous effects of the partisanship of government on firm-level 
stock market performance. Based on the surprise event in May 2001 when Senator James 
Jeffords left the Republican Party and tipped control of the U.S. Senate to the Democrats, 
Jayachandran shows that the effects of partisan control on stock prices varies according to the 
firm’s political contributions to each party. Studying the US Presidential election of 2000, 
Knight (2007) has found that specific policies in a party’s platform are characterized into equity 
prices: stock prices of those industries favored by a party improve with the electoral prospects of 
that party. Specifically, the result of the election was estimated to have a 3-6% effect on the 
value of firms whom analysts had identified as politically sensitive based on the candidates’ 
policy platforms. 
Estimates of firm-specific effects provide particularly convincing evidence because they 
are less likely to be produced by reverse causality. Nonetheless, they are rare because it is 
usually difficult to map political platforms onto firm-level characteristics. As a result of the 
difficulties in obtaining high frequency data on expected political outcomes and the difficulties   5
in mapping policy platforms to equity prices, the most convincing techniques for measuring 
partisan effects are rarely implemented, especially in developing countries. 
But it is developing countries that are likely the most fruitful ground for inquiry into the 
partisan effects on firm profitability. First, because democratic institutions constraining the 
ruling party tend to be weaker in these countries, the stakes of the election are likely to be greater 
(Henisz 2004). Second, given the simultaneous existence of both formal and informal venues for 
lobbying in developing countries, it is the incentives of firms in these countries which are most 
important for understanding corruption, bribery, and official lobbying (Campos and Giovannoni 
2006).   Consistent with these views, a growing literature suggests that a political turnover (or the 
expectation of it) has substantial effects on the stock market performance of private (esp. 
politically connected) firms in emerging markets (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Faccio, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 
2009).  
We make a contribution to this literature by measuring the economic impact of Taiwan’s 
electoral shocks on Taiwanese firms’ profitability in the context of the unresolved cross-strait 
issues between Taiwan and People’s Republic of China. Taiwanese politics provides us with a 
unique research opportunity. It is a two-party system whose cleavage derives mainly from a 
single unresolved issue: diplomatic and economic relations with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). On the one hand, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang, or KMT) favors eventual 
re-unification and thus advocates relatively unfettered commercial links with the mainland. On 
the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded on the principle of   6
Taiwanese independence and has thus been more reluctant about open economic relations with 
the mainland, fearing economic dependence that would in turn inhibit political independence.
3  
Given that the central issue of unification/independence continues to divide voters and 
political parties in Taiwan, the profit opportunities of Taiwanese firms in the mainland are likely 
to be quite sensitive to election outcomes. Investors might expect that a DPP victory would lead 
to a worsening of Taiwan's relations with the PRC and, as a consequence, raise the risk of 
expropriation or other discriminatory policies against Taiwanese firms operating in mainland 
China. In her recent discussion of economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland 
China, Whited (2008) summarized, “risk of political factors disrupting economic ties has 
remained an omnipresent concern… with Taiwanese investors almost certainly having more to 
fear than other foreign investors in mainland China.” Moreover, they might expect that the DPP 
government would further restrict investment of domestic Taiwanese firms in the mainland.  
Since the fortunes of Taiwanese firms with significant investment in the mainland depend on 
friendly diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and the liberal economic 
policy of the home government that permits financial investment in the mainland, the valuation 
of these firms’ mainland ventures, and thus the value of their equity shares likely depend, 
critically, on which party controls the government. There is thus a clear-cut partisan divide with 
important implications for a highly visible specific policy question which we can exploit to 
cleanly estimate the effects of government policy on private business in general. 
                                                 
3 Not surprisingly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been openly hostile to the DPP. The PRC has used a 
variety of tactics ranging from military exercises to television announcements to influence Taiwanese elections, 
attempting to intimidate voters against voting for the pro-independence DPP. More spectacularly, starting in April 
2005 while the DPP held the Taiwanese Presidency, PRC President Hu Jintao held a series of talks with KMT party 
chairman Lien-Hu to establish common goals for direct transportation links and increased visitation rights, removal 
of restraints on Chinese investment in Taiwan, and deregulation of trade in agricultural goods. This so-called “cross-
strait forum” constitutes a remarkable extra-legal dialogue over foreign policy in which the PRC went behind the 
back of the elected DPP government to negotiate independently with the out-of-power KMT and provides testament 
to the strong reluctance of the PRC to deal with the DPP.   7
The Taiwanese case also has methodological advantages emanating from the availability 
of a unique data set on the prediction market for the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan. In this 
political prediction market, developed only recently in Taiwan, investors purchased securities 
linked to the electoral performance of each candidate. Specifically, the owner of a security tied to 
candidate X receives a payoff based on the vote share of candidate X on Election Day. Thus, the 
price of the security on any given day reflects the market’s evaluation, on that day, of the 
expected performance of the relevant candidate. That is, these data provide a real-time, market-
based prediction of electoral outcomes, allowing us to capture unexpected shifts in the electoral 
outlook.
4 If investors are concerned about political risk, then information about the political 
fortunes of the parties, and thus the likely post-electoral course of policy, should affect the 
valuation of firms, in particular, those firms which earn significant portion of their profits from 
the mainland-related commercial activities. 
  To briefly preview our results, we find the share prices of Taiwanese firms with mainland 
investment respond negatively to a rise in the expected vote share of the DPP during the 
presidential election campaign of 2008, while those of firms without mainland investment were 
largely unaffected. These effects are also economically important: a 10 percentage point increase 
in the DPP’s expected vote share is, on average, associated with a 2 percent decline in the share 
price of firms with investment in the mainland. Moreover, the statistical association of share 
price to the DPP’s expected vote share is stronger for those firms that (i) have a greater value of 
assets at stake or (ii) are closer to the regulatory limit on cross-Strait investment which the KMT 
had credibly promised to relax. That is, these partisan effects are strongest for Taiwanese firms 
whose profit opportunities depend crucially on friendly diplomatic relations with PRC and 
unfettered commercial activity in the mainland economy. The case thus delivers compelling 
                                                 
4 Similar data in the US have been shown to be more accurate than polling data (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007).   8
evidence that elections and the attendant possibility of regime change pose considerable political 
risk to private firms in Taiwan.  
  This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes Taiwan’s political parties, 
elections, and diplomatic and economic relations with the mainland. Section 3 discusses the data. 





Multi-party democracy is relatively new to Taiwan. Following the arrival of Chiang Kai-
shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government in 1949, Taiwan was a single-party 
state under KMT rule. Abrogating term limits, direct elections, and other constitutional 
provisions, the KMT justified its authoritarian rule as necessary to mobilize and retake the 
mainland. But as the Communist Party in China (CPC) solidified its rule on the mainland and 
gained international recognition, this goal became increasingly unrealistic and thus the 
justification of autocracy became increasingly unconvincing. This led to strident calls for a truly 
democratic state enabling participation by those Taiwanese, approximately 85% of the 
population, whose residence pre-dated the KMT’s arrival. In response, the KMT gradually 
allowed for broader access to the party, local and then national elections, and, in 1987, lifted 
martial law and the ban on competing political parties.
5 
Political liberalization led to the rise of competing political parties. Most notably, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formally organized in 1986, was the first, largest, and most 
important opposition party. Following constitutional reforms in 1991, and beginning with the 
                                                 
5 Rigger (2002) describes the democratization process   9
openly competitive legislative elections of 1992, the DPP steadily gained in power and political 
clout, culminating in the two-term Presidency of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008.  
Born of the struggle to broaden democratic participation to include native Taiwanese, the 
DPP has, from its founding charter, advocated a fundamentally different relationship with 
mainland China than that pursued by the KMT. Prior to democratization, the KMT was dedicated 
to reunification of China under KMT rule. As a result, official KMT policy recognized “One 
China, Two Systems” and pursued negotiations with the Communist Party in China (CPC). By 
contrast, from its founding charter, the DPP maintained that decades of de-facto separation had 
produced durable cultural and economic differences with the mainland. On this basis, the DPP 
advocated formal legal independence bringing equal status with the PRC in international law. 
Nonetheless, as a result of electoral competition, the positions of both the KMT and the 
DPP have evolved. Adjusting to the necessities of governing—the need to cooperate with the 
KMT in parliament and the need to accommodate the demands of Taiwan’s most important ally, 
the United States, who has repeatedly warned against declarations of independence—President 
Chen moderated the traditional DPP rhetoric of de jure independence to a belligerent defense of 
the status quo de facto independence. In fact, Chen said in his 2000 inaugural speech that as long 
as the CPC has no intention of using military force against Taiwan, he would follow the “four 
no's,” (1) not declaring independence, (2) not changing the “national title,” (3) not including the 
concept of “state-to-state” relations between the island and the mainland in the Constitution, and 
(4) not promoting any referendum on changing the status quo in regard to independence. Several 
deliberate provocations, however, have been used both to distract the electorate from the DPP’s   10
poor economic record and to placate the still influential portion of the party membership which 
continues to agitate for formal independence.
6 
Meanwhile, having lost successive elections, the KMT came to recognize the electoral 
power of Taiwanese nationalism and gradually moderated its position on cross-strait relations to 
match the electorate’s desire to preserve the status quo of de facto independence.
7 The KMT 
having been outmaneuvered in the 2004 elections, 2008 candidate Ma Ying-jeou was very clear 
to emphasize that his election would not result in abrupt change in Taiwan’s status. To do so he 
formulated his “three no’s”: no unification, no independence, and no armed conflict would occur 
during his term. This was a clear and deliberate emulation of the four no’s Chen articulated 
during his 2000 inaugural speech. Moreover, Ma took pains to separate his party from the CPC. 
When Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a speech at the 17
th National Congress, suggested that 
issues related to China’s sovereignty and territory should be decided by “all of the Chinese, 
including Taiwanese”, Ma publicly retorted that Taiwan’s fate is for Taiwanese to decide. 
The parties having partially converged on the issue of political independence, the main 
axis of partisan competition has shifted to cross-strait economic policy. Nonetheless, the parties’ 
positions on cross-strait economic policy—which are discussed in the next section—are clearly 
motivated by their founding principles and derive directly from and are constrained by their well-
publicized preferences concerning cross-strait political relations. Given its suspicion of the 
                                                 
6 During the past several elections, DPP strategy has rested on the beliefs that its views on Taiwanese nationalism 
are closer to the voters than are the policies of the KMT. Prior to the 2001 legislative elections and both the 2004 
and the 2008 Presidential elections, Chen ratcheted up tensions with China, perhaps in a bid to increase the salience 
of cross-strait relations and deflect attention from the economy. A month before the 2001 elections, Chen declared 
publicly that he had never accepted the 1992 Consensus of “One China, Two Systems”. In 2003, Chen introduced a 
referendum to “ask China to withdraw their missiles to maintain the sovereignty of Taiwan and peace across the 
Taiwan Strait” (Bedford and Hwang, 2006). The referendum was to be part of the 2004 presidential election ballot. 
Seeking to replicate this strategy in 2008, Chen introduced a referendum asking whether Taiwan should apply for 
U.N. membership under the name “Taiwan”, again to be part of the presidential election ballot. In each case, the 
KMT accused Chen of seeking to distract voters from his economic record. See Wang (2000) for discussion of the 
DPP’s cross-Strait policy. 
7 Most Taiwanese voters support the status quo, with fewer in support of either unification or outright independence. 
(see Table 6.1 in Fell, 2005, and recent comments by Rigger, 2008)   11
mainland and hostility toward political reconciliation, the DPP is incapable of advocating 
stronger economic links without fundamentally altering its party constitution that maintains 
Taiwan is a sovereign country that is independent of the People’s Republic of China.
8 This 
constraint is becoming increasingly problematic electorally. 
 
2.2. The 2008 Presidential Election 
The 2008 Presidential elections took place on March 22nd, 2008 and were just the fourth 
direct election for the President of the Republic of China. It was a pivotal election since KMT 
victory would return the KMT to power after eight years of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian. Perhaps 
more importantly, since the KMT won the majority in the preceding parliamentary elections (81 
out of 113 seats), if the KMT were to win the popular vote in the presidential election, it would 
control both the executive and legislative branch, giving it much needed power to implement its 
preferred policy. In the end, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou defeated DPP candidate Frank Hsieh, 
winning the popular vote 58-41 percent.  
By 2008, both the KMT and the DPP were committed defenders of the status quo de 
facto independence. As a result, the DPP strategy of saber-rattling to distract voters was of 
declining effectiveness. Nevertheless, significant differences in cross-strait policy remain 
between the parties. Rather than differences over unification/independence, the primary 
                                                 
8 The first paragraph of DPP’s party constitution states that “territorial sovereignty and self-government are the 
preconditions for modern nations to establish the rule of law and to develop international relations.  The facts that 
Taiwan is sovereign and independent, that it does not belong to the People's Republic of China, and that the 
sovereignty of Taiwan does not extend to mainland China, reflect historical realities as well as the present situation, 
and at the same time form part of the consensus of the international community.  According to this reality of 
sovereignty and independence, Taiwan should draw up a constitution and establish a nation.  Only then is it possible 
to guarantee respect and security for Taiwanese society and for individual citizens, and to offer the people the 
opportunity to pursue freedom, democracy, prosperity, justice and self-realization.” 
http://www.dpp.org.tw/index_en/ , accessed on October 13, 2009.   12
differences during the election concern cross-strait economic policy.
9 The Taiwanese 
government has long restricted movement of people, goods, and money between Taiwan and the 
mainland (see Chang and Goldstein (2007) for a brief history of cross-Strait trade and 
investment). Most notably, the Taiwanese government imposed stringent limits on Taiwanese 
investment in mainland China: Taiwanese firms were allowed to invest no more than 20-40% of 
net worth.
10  
  The long-running debate has been over the degree to which economic relations should be 
liberalized. On the one hand, Taiwanese see incredible business opportunities and seek access to 
the Chinese market. On the other hand, they worry that developing such ties will necessarily 
endanger their political independence by rendering them vulnerable to economic pressure. The 
relative positions of the candidates in the 2008 Presidential elections were quite clear. Ma 
(KMT) advocated immediate negotiation with China towards a broad set of liberalizing measures. 
Unusually for campaign promises, the scope and content of the measures Ma proposed was 
already clearly defined and their feasibility established. In particular, during the campaign, Ma 
not only reiterated a commitment to direct transportation and increased visitation but explicitly 
called for the eventual establishment of a common market. As a result of the cross-strait dialogs 
of 2005-6 with the CPC, Ma’s campaign promises constituted a detailed and credible 
commitment to liberalize cross-strait economic relations. Finally, this commitment was stable 
and easily understood. As Rigger (2008) writes in her analysis of the Presidential elections, “Ma 
Ying-jeou held his campaign themes—including his position on cross-Strait relations—
remarkably steady through the long presidential campaign.”   
                                                 
9 See Fell (2005, p85): “in response to election results and moderate public opinion, election-oriented leaders have 
moved their parties away from highly polarized positions on the national identity issue towards more centrist 
positions. However, the parties have not converged… The development of this issue shows a clear pattern of party 
differentiation with… the public consistently able to distinguish between the parties.” 
10 The exact limit depends on the net worth of the firm and has varied over time.   13
  On the other hand, the DPP vehemently opposed most of these steps, especially 
liberalization of agricultural trade and the eventual goal of a common market (see Rigger 2008). 
Moreover, the mutual antagonism between the PRC and the DPP ensured that the DPP would be 
less capable of negotiating even the steps toward liberalization with which they agreed, such as 
the resumption of direct flights. The PRC rebuffed Chen’s early efforts to improve cross-strait 
relations citing the DPP’s pro-independence platform as an impediment to progress. Of the DPP, 
Rigger writes “Taiwan’s relations with Beijing and Washington have deteriorated over the past 
eight years… a major contributing factor was Chen Shui-bian’s determination to spend much of 
his presidency… strengthening Taiwan’s resistance to closer engagement with the PRC.” While 
it is not clear whether DPP candidate Frank Hsieh would have continued these policies, the past 
record of the DPP was clear for the voters and Hsieh never made a compelling case that he 
would break from this record. 
Thus far we have discussed only two parties: the DPP and the KMT. While the DPP was 
the first opposition party, it is by no means the only major national party formed since the ban 
was lifted in 1987. Five parties won seats in the 2004 legislative elections, making Taiwan a true 
multi-party system. However, the five major parties are organized into two durable electoral 
coalitions. The Pan-Blue Coalition consists of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP) and the 
New Party (NP). The Pan-Green Coalition consists of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU). Fell (2005) argues that the issue of national identity and cross-strait relations is the 
dominant issue in Taiwanese politics. The Blue and Green coalitions formed in the run-up to the 
2001 legislative elections and have endured ever since. In his analysis of the 2001 legislative 
elections, Copper (2002) argues these coalitions “made sense insofar as lines were fairly clearly 
drawn on the all-important issue of Taiwan’s national identity. The KMT, the PFP, and the NP   14
espoused a “broader view” that saw Taiwan as part of China…; the DPP and the TSU advocated 
a position called localization or Taiwan first.” In essence, the political space is dominated by a 
single dimension thereby stabilizing the electoral coalitions.  
In fact, both coalitions are consolidating into single parties meaning the two-coalition 
system is converging toward a two-party system. The KMT and the DPP dominate their 
respective coalitions: prior to the 2008 elections, the KMT held 90 of the blue coalition’s 118 
seats and the DPP held 90 of the green coalition’s 97 seats. Electoral reforms of 2008 have 
enhanced this dominance. The reforms cut the total number of districts in half from 225 to 113 
and moved from a system in which most seats were elected by proportional rule from multi-
member districts to one in which most seats are elected by majority rule from single-member 
districts. The increased emphasis on majority rule has naturally served to enhance the power of 
the two largest parties. In the 2008 elections the KMT won 81 of the Blue Coalition’s 85 seats 
and the DPP won all 27 of the Green coalition’s seats giving the two major parties a combined 
108 of the 113 seats in Congress. 
  In sum, at the time of the Presidential elections in 2008, the Taiwanese political system 
was dominated by two parties and the most important policy cleavage was cross-strait economic 
policy. Throughout the campaign, this cleavage was stark and stable and carried credible and 
detailed policy implications as a result of the KMT-CPC cross-strait forums and a disciplined 
campaign by KMT candidate Ma. As a result, the policy implications of the election were 
remarkably clear ex ante.
11 
                                                 
11 Moreover, these predictions have been rapidly born out ex-post. During the first fifteen months since the election, 
the Ma government has taken advantage of the huge KMT majority in the legislature to quickly implement the major 
planks of the KMT platform. Direct flights began July 5, 2008 and the number of Chinese visiting Taiwan from 
January – May 2009 was 2.8 times higher than the same period a year earlier (Taiwan News). Limits on Taiwanese 
investment in mainland China were increased from 40% to 60% of the company’s net value beginning August 1, 
2008 (China Daily). On June 5, 2009, the economics ministry announced the imminent opening of 100 sectors of the 
Taiwanese economy to FDI from mainland China (Economic Daily News).    15
 
3. Data 
3.1. Political Market Data
12 
The political markets for the 2008 Presidential Election are run by the Taipei Political 
Exchange (TPE).
13 The market opened on December 17, 2007 and closed on March 22, 2008, the 
day of the 2008 Presidential Election. There were 1,985 traders participating in the market. 
Although the market opened on December 17, 2007, actual trading did not take place until the 
next day, December 18, 2007. In addition, since March 22, 2008 was a Saturday, when the 
Taipei Stock Exchange is closed, the usable data that can match the data on the share price of 
Taiwanese firms for statistical analysis span from December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. 
The TPE is closely modeled on its older, better known American predecessor, the Iowa 
Electronic Markets (IEM), and shares many of its operating characteristics. As per the IEM, the 
TPE issues bundled contracts which participants then unbundle and trade, contracts pay out 
according to the realized vote-shares of the candidates, and prices are determined via a 
continuous double-auction conducted at a single website with zero transaction cost of trading.
14 
There is, however, one major difference between the IEM and the TPE. While the IEM is a real 
money market in which participants wager up to $500 of their own money when purchasing 
contracts, the TPE is a “play-money” exchange in which participants may open an account 
endowed with an initial balance of 10,000 units for free and do not risk their own money. 
Trading and account balances are tracked as per real-money exchanges but balances are not 
convertible to real money; instead, the ten participants with the highest balances at the end of the 
                                                 
12 This section is based on Tseng, Li, Wang (2009). 
13 http://socioecono.phys.sinica.edu.tw/exchange/exchange_eng.html 
 
14 For detailed explanation of the operation, efficiency, and accuracy of the IEM, see Berg et al (2000), Forsythe et 
al (1999), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), Oliven and Reitz (2004), and Rhode and Strumpf (2007).   16
market are awarded cash prizes. Rewards for 1st through 7th place were 10,000, 8,000, 6,000, 
5,000, 4,000, 2,500, and 1,500 (real) NT dollars, respectively. Those placing 8th through 10th 
each received 1,000 NT dollars.
15 It is in essence a tournament with a market mechanism for 
scoring.  
Many economists believe the demonstrated superior accuracy of prediction markets when 
compared to polls and pundits is due in large part to the fact that market participants must put 
their money where their mouth is, providing strong incentives for information discovery and 
truthful revelation. This line of reasoning would imply that play-money markets are less accurate 
and thus less useful for predictive purposes. Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock, and Galebach 
(2004) (henceforth SWPG) test this hypothesis with a careful comparison of two established 
prediction markets which are identical—same subject, sample period, contract structure, trading 
mechanism, and scoring rules—except that one is a real-money exchange, the other a play-
money exchange. Subjecting the data to a battery of tests, they conclude that not only do both of 
these markets beat 99% of the individual experts, but “the predictive accuracies of the two 
markets are indistinguishable.”  
Seeking to explain what to many may be a mystifying result, SWPG point out that lack of 
financial risk does not preclude material and psychological rewards and suggest that when the 
subject is one of deep interest with a rich informational environment, play-money markets can 
attract knowledgeable traders, generate intense trading, and result in substantial discovery and 
processing of the available information. Moreover, SWPG point out that play-money markets 
may actually do a better job weighting the opinions of the various traders. In a real-money 
market, trading credit is a function of wealth and thus probably related to factors other than 
                                                 
15 The average exchange rate over the period during which the political market was open was 1 USD = 31.8 NT 
dollar. The winners were also publicly acknowledged and given certificates.   17
predictive skill. By contrast, credit in play-money markets is a function of past success in that 
particular venue; thus the interpersonal opinion weights are likely more efficient. 
In sum, SWPG suggest that under certain circumstances, play-money markets can be as 
accurate as real-money markets. We feel the TPE operates under such circumstances. Politics is 
clearly an area in which there is strong intrinsic interest and a wealth of relevant public and 
private information. Table 1 shows that the TPE actually surpasses the IEM in trading volume. 
As a simple check of the credibility of the TPE data, we compare its movement with opinion poll 
results from two major media outlets: China Times and TVBS. Figures 5 and 6 show co-
evolution of prediction market and opinion poll results.
16 Although the correlation is not perfect, 
these series appear to move in synchronicity, confirming that prediction markets incorporate 
some of the information contained in the opinion polls. Thus we feel confident that the 2008 TPE 
represents an informative measure of popular ex-ante electoral expectations. 
The raw data records (1) the prices of two candidates, Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) and Frank 
Hsieh (DPP), which in principal capture their expected vote share, (2) the time of transaction, 
and (3) cumulative transaction volume from the opening of the market to the time of 
transaction.
17 To match the frequency of share price data from the Taipei Stock Exchange, we 
extract the last transaction of each day to find the “closing price” as of 1:30 pm, the time at 
which the Taipei Stock Exchange closes. Occasionally, the sum of the prices, which are 
supposed to capture the expected vote shares of all candidates, do not perfectly add up to 1. To 
make a fair inter-temporal comparison of these prices over time, we normalize by dividing each 
price by the sum of prices. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the prices of the DPP and KMT 
                                                 
16 The results of opinion polls are taken from two sources: United Daily News (http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2007-
08/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=109235) and TVBS 
(http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/rickliu/200803/rickliu-20080323100704.pdf) 
17 The data also contain the price of invalid votes, which remained stable (1-2%) throughout the period.   18
candidates over time. The observed divergence between the adjusted and unadjusted is minimal; 
therefore, we use the adjusted series in our regression analysis. For use in robustness checks, we 
also calculate the expected DPP margin of victory (DPP share minus KMT share)/(KMT share 
plus DPP share plus other shares), which is displayed in Figure 2.  
One concern with political market data is that the data might be noisy as uninformed 
traders drive prices away from “fundamental values” in the very short-run. Such short-run 
diversions may endure for a significant period before informed traders reestablish an efficient 
price. As a result, we are uncertain as to how much of the observed day-to-day fluctuation in 
these prices represents a meaningful shift in expectations of the electoral performance of each 
political party. If the noise-to-information ratio is high, our estimation of partisan effects will 
suffer from a well-known attenuation bias. Knight (2007) deals with this source of measurement 
error by converting the data to a weekly frequency and looking at the price at the end of Friday. 
Following his methodology, we extract the Friday prices from the daily data (Figures 3 and 4) 
and use both daily and weekly series.
18  
 
3.2. Share Price 
  We use Taipei Stock Exchange data recording the daily closing share price for 700 
firms.
19 We restrict our sample to the period (December 18, 2007 – March 21, 2008) to match the 
political prediction market data. During our sample period, the market was closed, in addition to 
weekends, on Tuesday, January 1, 2008 (New Year Holiday), from Monday, February 4, 2008 to 
                                                 
18 In addition, Knight (2007) uses opinion polls as an instrument to extract meaningful variation in prediction market 
movement in a robustness check. We attempt to replicate his results. In the Taiwanese case, however, we find that 
the opinion polls are not frequent enough and also the correlation between polls and prediction market variable is 
not strong enough to use it as an instrument (see Stock and Yogo, 2005, for discussion of the weak instrument 
problem). 
19 The Taipei Stock Exchange closes at 1:30. Thus, the closing price is the last price prevailing at 1:30 on every 
trading day.  http://www.twse.com.tw/en/trading/exchange/STOCK_DAY_AVG/STOCK_DAY_AVGMAIN.php   19
Monday, February  11, 2008 (Chinese Lunar New Year Holiday), and on Thursday Feburary 28, 
2008 (Peace Memorial Day), which leaves 61 trading days in our sample.
20  
 
3.3. Market Index (TAIEX and SHCOMP) 
The daily data on Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SHCOMP) are taken from the Taipei Stock 
Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange, respectively. Since the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
closed on two days, Monday, December 31, 2007 (New Year Holiday) and Tuesday, February, 
2008, New Year Holiday and Chinese Lunar New Year Holiday, the analysis that incorporate 
SHCOMP is based upon a slightly smaller sample size.   
 
3.4. Data on Investment in Mainland  
The Taipei Stock Exchange lists 517 firms with investment in the mainland as of the first 
quarter of 2008, the campaign period for the 2008 presidential election. To construct a proxy for 
the reliance of a firm’s earnings on mainland assets, we also divide total cumulative investment 
in China by total assets. In addition, the Taipei Stock Exchange disseminates the information 
about the maximum regulatory limit on the amount of investment in China that each firm is 
allowed to undertake. We identify those firms whose actual investment is in excess of 90% of 
their legal limit as particularly likely to be constrained by the regulatory limit and thus most 
likely to benefit from a KMT government. It is widely known that Taiwanese firms invest in the 
mainland through subsidiaries based in a third country such as Hong Kong or the British Virgin 
Islands. Our investment data do include indirect investments and show that, as of the first quarter 
                                                 
20 The data are an unbalanced panel because the price of a security is recorded only when that security is traded and 
not every security is traded on every trading day.   20
of 2008 (i.e., the period of the elections), Taiwanese firms directly invest in a mainland company 
in only 28 out of 2384 cases.
21 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The richness of the political market data enables a simple econometric methodology. 
Following Knight (2007), we relate the share price of firms with investment in the mainland to 
the share price (i.e., expected vote share) of the DPP candidate, Frank Hsieh. The basic empirical 
specification is: 
 
it i t it RD P P       (1) 
 
For firms listed on the Taipei Stock Exchange, Rit is the return on firm i’s shares on day t. DPP is 
the change in the expected performance of the DPP candidate. Firm-specific intercept i captures 
the average return of firm i. A negative coefficient on DPP would suggest that the electoral 
victory of the DPP poses political risk to firms with investment in China.  
The main advantage of this basic specification is its simplicity, but a disadvantage is that 
the estimate of γ could be contaminated by a third (unobserved) factor that drives both political 
and financial markets in Taiwan; e.g., negative economic news adversely affects financial 
markets while at the same time possibly damaging the electoral prospects of the incumbent party 
                                                 
21  One concern with the prevalence of indirect investment via a third country is that there might still be “hidden 
mainland investment” even though firms are obligated by law to report all investment in the mainland via a third 
country. However, unmeasured mainland investment might not be a serious problem for two reasons. First, to the 
extent that it is successfully diverted and thus hidden from the authorities and financial market participants, it is thus 
not subject to the political risk and has no influence on our market-based estimate of partisan effects. Second, the 
bias that could arise from such measurement error is likely to go against finding a significant relationship between 
the reported mainland investment and partisan effects, given that financial market participants are likely to have 
more information about the true exposure of each firm to the expected policy changes than we do.   21
(the DPP in the case of the 2008 presidential election). To overcome this possible bias, we 
extend the basic specification to control for market return in the Taiwan Stock Exchange: 
 
it i i t t it R TAIEX DPP       (2) 
 
where TAIEX is the returns on Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index. 
This specification also allows us to test whether abnormal returns were systematically related to 
the performance of DPP’s share in Taiwan Political Exchange.  
  The share price of Taiwanese firms that are commercially active in the mainland might 
also be sensitive to the economic condition of the mainland economy.
22 Therefore, we check the 
robustness of our results by including market return in the Shanghai Stock Exchange: 
 
it i i t i t t it R TAIEX SHCOMP DPP         (3) 
 
where SHCOMP is the returns on Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index.
23  
We also run two placebo (or falsification) tests. While we expect partisanship in the 
Taiwanese government to affect the prospects of Taiwanese firms with investments in the 
mainland, it ought not affect Taiwanese firms with no such investments. Thus, we can estimate 
Equations (1) - (3) on this second set of firms to see if the correlation exists where it should not. 
Alternatively, we can pool all firms together and estimate the following regression model: 
 
                                                 
22 Since the presidential election featured intense debates on Taiwan’s economic relationship with the PRC, it is 
plausible that the outcome of political prediction markets might in part be driven by the economic conditions in the 
mainland. 
23 We also use the Shanghai Stock Exchange A-Share Index. The results are qualitatively similar and thus not 
reported to conserve space.   22
12* it i i t i t t i t it R TAIEX SHICOMP DPP CHINA DPP          (4) 
 
where CHINA is a set of variables that includes a binary indicator of firms with investment in the 
mainland, a continuous measure of the ratio of assets in the mainland to total assets, and an 
indicator of those firms whose total mainland investment is more than 90% of the maximum 
legal limit.  If investors anticipated that the DPP government would reduce Taiwanese firms’ 
profit opportunities in the mainland by either worsening diplomatic relations with the PRC or 
maintaining rigid limits on the mainland investment, the coefficient on CHINA*DPP should be 
negative; that is the partisan effects should be larger for firms whose investment in the mainland 
is larger and/or closer to the maximum limit, relative to a similar firm that has no investment in 
the mainland.  
  Lastly, because our key independent variable, DPP, varies over time (t), but not across 
firms (i) at a point in time, the usual standard errors are invalid if returns are contemporaneously 
correlated across firms. Thus we correct standard errors for arbitrary contemporaneous 
correlation across firms. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Basic Results 
As per Knight (2007), the daily and weekly data generate starkly different results. The 
results based on daily data are characterized by small coefficients that are not statistically 
distinguishable from zero (Table 2). As discussed in section 3.1, we suspect that the political 
markets data are noisy at high frequencies; as a result, the results using daily data suffer serious   23
attenuation bias. Knight documents similar behavior using IEM data and the TPE is 
characterized by a similar design and comparable volume. 
The results based on weekly data are reported in Table 3. As we add both TAIEX and 
SHCOMP to control for overall market risk, the goodness of fit improves dramatically, although 
the results are qualitatively similar without these indices. As we compare the results based on 
firms with mainland investment with those without it, the coefficient on DPP vote share is 
always smaller for the latter and never statistically significant (table 3: columns 2, 6, and 10). 
When we control for both TAIEX and SHCOMP, the coefficient on DPP vote share is negative 
and significant for firms with mainland investment (table 3: column 9). The magnitude of the 
estimated effect is also quite large. The average weekly fluctuation in expected vote share was 
3.6 percentage points,
24 which would result in 83.5 basis points change in the share prices of 
firms with mainland investment, based on the coefficient on the expected DPP vote share in table 
3, column 9.  Given that the average weekly return during our sample period for TAIEX listed 
firms is 90 basis points, partisan political effects are large compared to the background of other 
factors which drive firm returns.
25  
Furthermore, the results based upon pooled regression confirm that our results pass the 
key placebo test: the difference in the size of the coefficient is statistically significant (table 3: 
columns 3, 7, and 11). We also find that the sensitivity of share price is systematically related to 
the ratio of assets in the mainland to total assets (table 3: columns 4, 8, and 12). Where mainland 
investment is a greater fraction of total assets, returns are more sensitive to the political 
                                                 
24 See Table A1 for summary statistics. 
25 Ideally, we would like to quantify the difference in firm value that would result from having one government vs. 
the other. In order to do this, we should look at the marginal effect as expected probability of DPP victory goes from 
0 to 1 to estimate the total value of the DPP platform. But to do so requires converting changes in expected vote 
share into changes in expected probability of victory. Unfortunately, there is no clear translation from one to the 
other. Given the election wasn’t particularly close, a 1% change in expected vote share probably didn’t have a large 
change in the probability of DPP victory. So the fact that there are significant stock market responses suggests these 
firms would be very strongly helped by a DPP victory.   24
campaign. These results are robust to re-estimation using the difference between DPP vote share 
and KMT vote share (table 4).  
Overall, our analyses show clear evidence of partisan effects in Taiwan: financial markets 
fear that the DPP government would reduce the profit opportunity of Taiwanese firms with 
investment in the mainland directly by continuing to impose stringent limits on mainland 
investment or indirectly by worsening the diplomatic relation with the PRC thus raising 
expropriation risk in the mainland.   
To distinguish between these two channels, we examine whether the partisan effects are 
particularly large for firms that are close to the regulatory constraints (table 5). We find that a 
dummy variable for firms whose investment is close to the limit is negative and significant 
(columns 1, 4, and 7) and, moreover, that it remains significant even after controlling for 
investment presence in the mainland (columns 2, 5, and 8). That is, the magnitude of the partisan 
effects are larger on a firm that is facing tight regulatory constraint even compared to a subset of 
other Taiwanese firms that have active mainland investment. A one percentage point increase in 
expected DPP vote share leads to a decline of 12.7 basis points in the weekly returns of firms 
whose investment in the mainland has not approached the cap while those firms close to the limit 
suffer a decline which, at 25.6 basis points, is twice as large. These results suggest that the 
negative effects of the DPP on Taiwanese firms partly reflect the anticipated relaxation of 
investment limits under a KMT government.   
The results also show that even after controlling for an indicator of firms that are 
constrained by the legal limit, the coefficient on dummy for firms with mainland investment 
remains negative and statistically significant (columns 2, 5, and 8). That is, even those firms with 
ample room to expand their operation in the mainland were negatively affected by the possible   25
electoral victory of the DPP, which might suggest that market participants feared diplomatic 
instability between the PRC and Taiwan under the DPP government and imputed expropriation 
risk into equity price of firms with active investment in the mainland. 
 
5.2. Trade Effects 
  The KMT also advocated fewer travel restrictions, reducing the lists of banned imports 
and exports, and the eventual realization of common markets between the mainland and Taiwan, 
each of which would have reduced transaction costs associated with trade with the PRC.
26 Thus, 
one would expect that a DPP victory would have had negative effects on firms exporting finished 
products to or importing intermediate goods from the mainland. Unfortunately, there are no firm-
level data on imports and exports between Taiwan and the PRC. However, in the firm-level 
description, Worldscope reports whether the firm exports to Asia. Feeling this would reasonably 
capture those firms who either already export to China or could readily do so, we use this 
descriptor to identify a group of Taiwanese firms that are likely to benefit from a liberalization of 
cross-strait trade relations. Needless to say, the results with exports must be interpreted with 
caution because some of the firms that export to Asia do not export to the PRC but our measure 
nonetheless groups them with those that do. Moreover, Worldscope’s coverage of Taiwan is 
limited to 512 of the 700 publicly traded firms. 
Despite the crudeness of our measure, we find significant effects. The share prices of 
firms that export to Asia react negatively to improvements in the expected DPP performance as 
per firms with mainland investment (table 6). Moreover, the negative coefficient on the 
interaction of mainland investment with DPP share is robust to the inclusion of this dummy 
                                                 
26 Whited (2008) notes that “direct trade and transport ties to replace indirect shipping via Hong Kong or, to some 
extent, Japan… would significantly add to the attractiveness of cross-strait trade” and cites figures that transshipping 
via a third area adds as much as 5% of the total value of cross-strait trade to the cost (p192).   26
variable for export to Asia (column 2 in both tables 6), which suggests investors anticipated and 
responded to changes in the policy environment for both cross-strait trade and investment. While 
it is safe to say that partisan effects in Taiwan are likely to operate through both investment and 
trade, multi-collinearity—85 % of firms that export to Asia have investment in the mainland 
while 67% of firms with investment in the mainland export to Asia—prevents us from 
concluding as to the relative importance of trade restrictions, investment restrictions, and 
expropriation risk.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The Taiwanese Presidential Election of 2008 constitutes a clean experiment for 
measuring the political risk faced by Taiwanese firms: the election was dominated by a single 
issue on which the two parties maintained stable, credible, well-articulated policies with starkly 
different implications for a clearly identifiable subset of Taiwanese firms. Judged against the 
baseline of KMT policy, a DPP victory would have implied adverse effects on firms with active 
investment in mainland China via two channels. First, maintaining the limits on cross-strait 
investment would have directly hurt those firms currently operating close to the investment cap 
by denying them opportunities to expand their operations in mainland China. Second, the DPP’s 
habit of provocative displays of independence, combined with the PRC’s threat to declare war 
should formal independence be declared, likely heightens expropriation risk for Taiwanese firms 
with mainland investment.  
As expected, our results show that the share prices of firms close to the limit are more 
sensitive to the electoral campaign than those firms whose investment in mainland China has not 
yet approached the firm-specific cap, confirming that the policy-platform was capitalized into   27
equity price. Moreover, our results show a statistically significant effect for those firms that have 
mainland investments but are not close to the legal limit, suggesting the pricing of expropriation 
risk. During the cross-strait tensions preceding the Taiwanese elections of 1996, the Taiwanese 
stock market plummeted as capital fled the island. While cross-strait relations are calmer now, 
our results suggest that Taiwanese firms continue to face significant risk from the simmering 
uncertainty. 
   28
References  
Bechtel, Michael M. and Fuss, Roland (2008); “When Investors Enjoy Less Policy Risk: Divided 
Government, Economic Policy Change, and Stock market Volatility in Germany, 1970-2005”; 
Swiss Political Science Review v14, n2, p216-254. 
 
Bedford, Olwen and Kwang-Huo Hwang; (2006); Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: The 
Social Psychology of Taiwan; Palgrave McMillan. 
 
Berg, J., R. Forsythe, F. Nelson, and T. Rietz; (2000); “Results from a Dozen Years of Election 
Futures Markets Research,” Working paper, College of Business Administration, University of 
Iowa. 
 
Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan; Wiwattanakantang, Yupana; (2009); “Big Business Owners in 
Politics.” Review of Financial Studies, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 2133-68. 
 
Campos, Nauro and Giovannoni, Francesco (2007), “Lobbying, Corruption and Political 
Influence”, Public Choice 131: 1-21.. 
 
Chang, Julian and Steven M. Goldstein; (2007); “Introduction: The WTO and Cross-Strait 
Economic Relations” in Economic Reform and Cross-Strait Relations: Taiwan and China in the 
WTO; Chang and Goldstein (eds.) 
 
Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc. (2008). “Political Connections and Preferential 
Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 
88, no. 3, pp. 554-80 
 
Copper, John F.; (2002); Taiwan’s 2001 Legislative, Magistrates and Mayors Election: Further 
Consolidating Democracy?; World Scientific Publishing Co. and Singapore University Press. 
 
Drazen, Allan; (2001); “The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years” in NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 2000; p75-117. MIT Press. 
 
Faccio, Mara; (2006); “Politically Connected Firms” American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 1, 
pp. 369-86 
 
Fell, Dafydd; (2005); Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of 
Taiwan, 1991-2004; Routledge. 
 
Fisman, Raymond (2001). “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” American Economic 
Review, vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 1095-1102. 
 
Forsythe, R., T. A. Reitz, and T. W. Ross; (1999); “Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey 
on Price Formation in Election Stock Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
Vol. 39, p. 83-110. 
   29
Fuss, Roland and Bechtel, Michael M. (2008); “Partisan Politics and Stock Market Performance: 
The Effect of Expected Government Partisanship on Stock Returns in the 2002 German Federal 
Election”; Public Choice v135, n3-4, p131-150. 
 
Heckelman, Jac C. (2006) “Another Look at the Evidence for Rational Partisan Cycles” Public 
Choice v126, n3-4 p257-274. 
 
Henisz, Witold J. (2004) “Political Institutions and Policy Volatility”. Economics and Politics, 
vol. 16, pp1-27. 
 
Hibbs, Douglas A. (1977) “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy” The American Political 
Science Review 71 (4): 1467-1487 
 
Jayachandran, Seema. (2006). “The Jeffords Effect.” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 49, no. 
2, pp. 397-425 
 
Johnson, Simon; Mitton, Todd; (2003); “Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from 
Malaysia,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 351-82. 
 
Knight, Brian.(2007) “Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the 
Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election”. Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 91 (1-2). p 389-409.  
 
Mukherjee, Bumba and Leblang, David (2007); “Partisan Politics, Interest Rates and the Stock 
Market: Evidence from American and British Returns in the Twentieth Century” Economics and 
Politics v19, n2, p135-167. 
 
Oliven, K. and T. A. Reitz; (2004); “Suckers are Born but Markets are Made: Individual 
Rationality, Arbitrage, and Market Efficiency on an Electronic Futures Markets,” Management 
Science, vol. 50, p. 336-351. 
 
Rhode, P. W. and K. S. Strumpf; (2007); “Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A Field 
Experiment and a Century of Observational Data,” working paper, NBER. 
 
Rigger, S.; (2008); “Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Elections”; Orbis vol. 52, no. 4 pp. 
689-700. 
 
Servan-Schreiber, Emile; Wolfers, Justin; Pennock, David M.; Galebach, Brian. Prediction 
Markets; (2004); “Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?” Electronic Markets, vol. 14(3), p. 
243-251. 
 
Shelton, Cameron (2010). “The Information Content of Elections and Varieties of the Partisan 
Political Business Cycle.” Public Choice; forthcoming. 
 
Snowberg, Erik; Wolfers, Justin; Zitzewitz, Eric. (2007a) “Partisan Impacts on the Economy: 
Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 
122 (2). p 807-29.    30
 
Snowberg, Erik; Wolfers, Justin; Zitzewitz, Eric. (2007b) “Party Influence in Congress and the 
Economy.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science. Vol. 2 (3). p 277-286.  
 
Stock, James H; Yogo, Motohiro. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.” 
Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. 
Andrews, Donald W. K. Stock, James H., eds., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. p 80-108. 2005. 
 
Tseng, Jie-Jun; Li, Sai-Ping; Wang Sun-Chon. (2009) “Experimental evidence for the interplay 
between individual wealth and transaction network.” Mimeo. 
 
Wang, T. Y.; (2000); “‘One China, One Taiwan’: An analysis of the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s China Policy”; in Taiwan in Perspective by Wei-Chin Lee (ed.); Brill. 
 
Whited, Hsin-hui I. H. (2008) “Economic Interdependence with Taiwan” in China’s Monetary 
Challenges: Past Experiences and Future Prospects, ed. Richard Burdekin, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Wolfers, Justin and Eric Zitzewitz. (2004) “Prediction Markets.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 18(2) 107-126. 
 
Zhao, Suisheng; (2008); “Strategic Dilemma of Beijing’s Taiwan Policy: Chinese Nationalism 
and the Making of the Anti-Secession Law”; in The ‘One China’ Dilemma by Peter C. Y. Chow 
(ed.); Palgrave MacMillan.   31









24dec2007 15jan2008 05feb2008 26feb2008 18mar2008
Date
DPP Share DPP Share (adjusted)
KMT Share KMT Share (adjusted)
 
   32











































24dec2007 15jan2008 05feb2008 26feb2008 18mar2008
Date
   33











24dec2007 15jan2008 05feb2008 26feb2008 18mar2008
Date
DPP Share (adjusted) KMT Share (adjusted)
   34



















































24dec2007 15jan2008 05feb2008 26feb2008 18mar2008
Date
   35
















24dec2007 08jan2008 22jan2008 05feb2008 19feb2008 04mar2008
Date
Poll (China Times) DDP Margin of Victory (adjusted)
   36











15jan2008 05feb2008 26feb2008 18mar2008
Date
Poll (TVBS) DDP Margin of Victory (adjusted)
 
 
 Table 1: Comparing the TPE with the IEM
weekly unit volume
mean std dev. min max
KMT 6290 6575 292 24870
DPP 6029 5403 398 20253
Dem 435 346 0 1273
Rep 489 364 0 1131
Dem 1159 866 216 3625
Rep 1280 878 196 4026
Dem 566 365 40 2167




US 2000Table 2: Basic Results (daily data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
mainland investment mainland investment mainland investment
Dependent variable: Daily Return yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled
Change in DPP Vote Share -0.0523 -0.0702 -0.0702 -0.0579 0.0131 -0.0115 -0.0115 0.00542 0.00693 -0.00815 -0.00815 0.00537
(0.0613) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0593) (0.0219) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0202) (0.0229) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0203)
Mainland investment dummy * 
Change in DPP Vote Share 0.0180 0.0247 0.0151
(0.0304) (0.0294) (0.0307)
Mainland investment * Change in 
DPP Vote Share 0.0114 0.0156 -0.0353
(0.0900) (0.0906) (0.0900)
TAIEX controls no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SHCOMP controls no no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 28975 10582 39557 39557 28975 10582 39557 39557 27044 9881 36925 36925
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.372 0.285 0.346 0.346 0.399 0.322 0.377 0.376
Number of firms 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Daily data cover the period: December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. Change in DPP Vote Share is daily change in the price of a Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) contract in Taiwan Political Exchange. Mainland investment dummy equals 1 if a firm has subsidiaries in the People's 
Republic of China. Mainland investment is the ratio of mainland assets to total assets. All specifications include firm-specific intercepts. For 
 specifications that control for Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), percentage change in TAIEX is interacted 
with firm-specific dummy variable to allow for firm specific market risk (beta). Similarly, for specifications that control for Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index (SHCOMP), percentage change in SHCOMP is interacted with firm dummy. Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firms.Table 3: Basic Results (weekly data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
mainland investment mainland investment mainland investment
Dependent variable: Daily Return yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled
Change in DPP Vote Share -0.202 -0.0769 -0.0769 -0.129 -0.161 -0.0423 -0.0423 -0.0903 -0.232** -0.0882 -0.0882 -0.143
(0.255) (0.236) (0.236) (0.244) (0.193) (0.201) (0.201) (0.173) (0.0978) (0.144) (0.143) (0.101)
Mainland investment dummy * 
Change in DPP Vote Share -0.125** -0.119*** -0.144**
(0.0458) (0.0371) (0.0649)
Mainland investment * Change in 
DPP Vote Share -0.558* -0.554 -0.732***
(0.277) (0.317) (0.171)
TAIEX controls no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SHCOMP controls no no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 5767 2099 7866 7866 5767 2099 7866 7866 5767 2099 7866 7866
R-squared 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.436 0.349 0.410 0.410 0.516 0.410 0.484 0.484
Number of firms 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weekly data cover the period: December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. Change in DPP Vote Share is weekly change in the price of a Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) contract in Taiwan Political Exchange. Mainland investment dummy equals 1 if a firm has subsidiaries in the People's 
Republic of China. Mainland investment is the ratio of mainland assets to total assets. All specifications include firm-specific intercepts. For 
 specifications that control for Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), percentage change in TAIEX is interacted 
with firm-specific dummy variable to allow for firm specific market risk (beta). Similarly, for specifications that control for Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index (SHCOMP), percentage change in SHCOMP is interacted with firm dummy. Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firms.Table 4: Robustness Using Margin of Victory
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
mainland investment mainland investment mainland investment
Dependent variable: Daily Return yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled yes no pooled pooled
Change in DPP Margin of Victory -0.0986 -0.0389 -0.0389 -0.0644 -0.0733 -0.0169 -0.0169 -0.0403 -0.108* -0.0389 -0.0389 -0.0654
-0.126 -0.117 -0.117 -0.121 -0.102 -0.105 -0.105 -0.0905 -0.054 -0.0766 -0.0764 -0.0548
Mainland investment dummy * 
Change in DPP Margin of Victory -0.0597** -0.0564** -0.0687**
-0.0225 -0.0184 -0.0305
Mainland investment * Change in 
DPP Margin of Victory -0.258 -0.255 -0.341***
-0.149 -0.171 -0.088
TAIEX controls no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SHCOMP controls no no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 5767 2099 7866 7866 5767 2099 7866 7866 5767 2099 7866 7866
R-squared 0.013 0.002 0.01 0.009 0.435 0.349 0.409 0.409 0.514 0.409 0.483 0.483
Number of firms 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700 509 191 700 700
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weekly data cover the period: December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. Change in DPP Margin of Victory is weekly change in the difference 
between the price of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) contract minus that of a Kuomintang (KMT) contract the in Taiwan Political Exchange.
 Mainland investment dummy equals 1 if a firm has subsidiaries in the People's Republic of China. Mainland investment is the ratio of mainland 
assets to total assets. All specifications include firm-specific intercepts. For specifications that control for Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization 
Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), percentage change in TAIEX is interacted with firm-specific dummy variable to allow for firm specific market risk 
(beta). Similarly, for specifications that control for Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SHCOMP), percentage change in SHCOMP is 
interacted with firm dummy. Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firms.Table 5: The Effects of the Investment Limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
mainland investment mainland investment mainland investment
Dependent variable: Daily Return pooled pooled pooled pooled pooled pooled pooled pooled pooled
Change in DPP Vote Share -0.168 -0.0769 -0.112 -0.130 -0.0423 -0.0731 -0.194* -0.0882 -0.126
(0.247) (0.236) (0.249) (0.191) (0.201) (0.177) (0.105) (0.143) (0.103)
Mainland investment dummy * 
Change in DPP Vote Share -0.127** -0.122** -0.146*
(0.0474) (0.0398) (0.0687)
Indicator Investment within 90% of 
limit * Change in DPP Vote Share -0.165** -0.129** -0.0401 -0.160*** -0.125** -0.0330 -0.151*** -0.110* -0.00121
(0.0544) (0.0574) (0.0572) (0.0492) (0.0550) (0.0381) (0.0434) (0.0529) (0.0406)
Mainland investment * Change in 
DPP Vote Share -0.927*** -0.943*** -1.116***
(0.251) (0.278) (0.226)
TAIEX controls no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
SHCOMP controls no no no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.411 0.412 0.412 0.482 0.484 0.484
Number of firms 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weekly data cover the period: December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. Change in DPP Vote Share is weekly change in the price of a Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) contract in Taiwan Political Exchange. Mainland investment dummy equals 1 if a firm has subsidiaries in the People's 
Republic of China. Mainland investment is the ratio of mainland assets to total assets. Indicator investment within 90% of limit is a dummy variable 
for firms whose total mainland is within 90 of legal limit. All specifications include firm-specific intercepts. 
For specifications that control for Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), percentage change in TAIEX is interacted 
with firm-specific dummy variable to allow for firm specific market risk (beta). Similarly, for specifications that control for Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index (SHCOMP), percentage change in SHCOMP is interacted with firm dummy. Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firmTable 6: The Effects on Exporting Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Daily Return
Change in DPP Vote Share 0.0381 -0.000662 -0.0212
(0.153) (0.124) (0.126)
Export to Asia * Change in DPP Vote Share -0.222*** -0.231*** -0.252***
(0.0452) (0.0547) (0.0539)
Mainland investment dummy * Change in DPP Vote Share -0.103
(0.0607)
Mainland investment * Change in DPP Vote Share -0.467**
(0.181)
Indicator Investment within 90% of limit * Change in DPP Vote Share 0.0171
(0.0611)
TAIEX controls yes yes yes
SHCOMP controls yes yes yes
Observations 5943 5943 5943
R-squared 0.484 0.484 0.483
Number of firms 525 525 525
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weekly data cover the period: December 18, 2007 to March 21, 2008. Change in DPP Vote Share is weekly change in the price of a Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) contract in Taiwan Political Exchange. Mainland investment dummy equals 1 if a firm has subsidiaries in the People's 
Republic of China. Mainland investment is the ratio of mainland assets to total assets. Indicator investment within 90% of limit is a dummy variable 
for firms whose total mainland is within 90 of legal limit. Export to Asia is a dummy variable for firms that export to Asia. All specifications include 
firm-specific intercepts. For specifications that control for Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), percentage  
change in TAIEX is interacted with firm-specific dummy variable to allow for firm specific market risk (beta). Similarly, for specifications that control 
 for Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SHCOMP), percentage change in SHCOMP is interacted with firm dummy. Standard errors are 
 adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firms.Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Weekly Return (%) overall 0.900 6.685 -29.866 32.696 N =    7866
between 2.353 -23.251 19.711 n =     700
within 6.425 -28.232 30.880 T-bar = 11.2371
TAIEX (%) overall 0.591 3.440 -5.591 5.577 N =    8400
between 0.000 0.591 0.591 n =     700
within 3.440 -5.591 5.577 T =      12
SHCOMP (%) overall -2.462 4.605 -9.717 4.001 N =    8400
between 0.000 -2.462 -2.462 n =     700
within 4.605 -9.717 4.001 T =      12
Change in DPP Vote Share (%) overall 0.217 3.583 -4.240 8.251 N =    8400
between 0.000 0.217 0.217 n =     700
within 3.583 -4.240 8.251 T =      12
Change in DPP Margin of Victory  (%) overall 0.304 7.239 -8.489 16.482 N =    8400
between 0.000 0.304 0.304 n =     700
within 7.239 -8.489 16.482 T =      12
Mainland investment  overall 0.071 0.090 0.000 0.882 N =    9100
between 0.090 0.000 0.882 n =     700
within 0.000 0.071 0.071 T =      13
Mainland investment dummy overall 0.727 0.445 0.000 1.000 N =    9100
between 0.446 0.000 1.000 n =     700
within 0.000 0.727 0.727 T =      13
Indicator Investment within 90% of limit overall 0.049 0.215 0.000 1.000 N =    9100
between 0.215 0.000 1.000 n =     700
within 0.000 0.049 0.049 T =      13
Export to Asia overall 0.621 0.485 0.000 1.000 N =    6825
between 0.486 0.000 1.000 n =     525
within 0.000 0.621 0.621 T =      13